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Abstract In this paper, the relations between science and technology, intervention
and representation, the natural and the artiﬁcial are analysed on the background of the
formationofmodernscienceinthesixteenthcentury.Duetothefactthattechniquehas
been essential for modern science from its early beginning, modern science is char-
acterised by a hybridisation of knowledge and intervention. The manipulation of
nature in order to measure its properties has steadily increased until artiﬁcial things
have been produced, such as laser beams, chemical compounds, elementary particles.
Furthermore,thestructuralbracingofnaturalscience,technologicaldevelopment,and
industrial exploitation of nature go also back to the foundation of modern science. In
order to strengthen the debate on technoscience against this background, the speciﬁc
characteristics of technoscientiﬁc objects have to be clariﬁed as have the speciﬁc
characteristics of the social organisation of technoscience and its performance.
Re ´sume ´ Cet article analyse les relations entre la science et la technologie, l’inter-
vention et la repre ´sentation, le naturel et l’artiﬁciel a ` la lumie `re de la formation de la
science moderne au 16e `me sie `cle. Compte tenu du fait que la technique a e ´te ´ un
e ´le ´mentessentieldelasciencemodernede `ssesorigines,cettedernie `reestcaracte ´rise ´e
par une hybridisation de la connaissance et de l’intervention. La manipulation de la
nature dans le but de mesurer ses proprie ´te ´s a fortement augmente ´ jusqu’a ` ce que des
choses artiﬁcielles soient produites comme les rayons laser, les composants chimi-
ques, les particules e ´le ´mentaires. De plus, l’entrecroisement structurel des sciences
naturelles, du de ´veloppement technologique et de l’exploitation industrielle de la
nature remontent jusqu’a ` la fondation de la science moderne. A la lumie `re de ces
e ´le ´ments et dans le but de renforcer le de ´bat sur la technoscience, les caracte ´ristiques
spe ´ciﬁques des objets technoscientiﬁques doivent e ˆtre clariﬁe ´es, de la me ˆme manie `re
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DOI 10.1007/s10202-011-0102-1que les caracte ´ristiques de l’organisation sociale de la technoscience et sa
performance.
Zusammenfassung In diesem Beitrag wird vor dem Hintergrund der Entstehung
der modernen Naturwissenschaft im 16. Jahrhundert das Verha ¨ltnis von Naturwis-
senschaft und Technologie, von Intervention und Repra ¨sentation, von Natu ¨rlichem
und Widernatu ¨rlichem analysiert. Auf Grund der Tatsache, dass von Anfang an
Technik ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der modernen Naturwissenschaft war, war
Naturwissenschaft immer schon durch eine Hybridisierung von Wissen und Inter-
vention charakterisiert. Die Manipulation der Natur zur selektiven Messung ihrer
Eigenschaften hat stetig zugenommen bis ku ¨nstliche Dinge wie chemische Verbin-
dungen,LASER-StrahlenundElementarteilchenproduziertwerdenkonnten.Daru ¨ber
hinaus kann die strukturelle Verklammerung von Naturwissenschaft, technischem
Fortschritt und industrieller Naturausbeutung ebenfalls bis zur Entstehung der mo-
dernen Naturwissenschaft zuru ¨ckverfolgt werden. Zur Scha ¨rfung und Zuspitzung der
Diskussion um die Technowissenschaften ist es angesichts der oben genannten his-
torischen Zusammenha ¨nge notwendig, die speziﬁschen Charakteristika technowi-
ssenschaftlicher Objekte zu kla ¨ren und die speziﬁschen Charakteristika sozialer
Dimensionen und Abla ¨ufe technowissenschaftlicher Prozesse herauszuarbeiten.
1 Introduction
Since Thomas Kuhn (1976 [1962]) showed that progress in natural science is
considerably dependent on extra-scientiﬁc aspects, such as personality, power, and
culture, science studies have at least integrated the social dimensions of science into
their analysis. As a result of these investigations, the inﬂuence of values, moral
concepts and world views, of power and domination on the formation of notions, on
scientiﬁc theories, and on the selection of research questions has become more and
more evident and has questioned the ideal of science as the realm of objectivity and
truth. Today, not only scholars of science and technology studies (STS) perceive
science as a social process. Vice versa science has become a core element of modern
societies in which essential systems, such as water and energy supply and
transportation, rely on complex highly sophisticated technology. The importance of
science for society is expressed most obviously by the idea that industrial societies
are transforming into knowledge societies. These transitions affect not only the
organisation of labour, production of goods and food, and almost all other aspects of
daily life, but also the organisation of research and the production of knowledge.
The related developments concerning the organisation of research have been
analysed by several scholars and have been discussed in terms such as, technoscience
(Latour 1987), post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993), mode 2 (Gibbons
et al. 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001), and triple-helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997).
They have in common that the interactions between science, policy, and economy are
increasing.Governmentstrytoinﬂuence science withthe helpofresearchprogrammes
in order to enable technological innovations and thus stimulate economic growth. But
policy relies on scientiﬁc expertise in order to handle the complexity of modern
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funding.
How the term technoscience relates to these general developments is still under
discussion, whether it focuses on speciﬁc elements of this transition process or
whether it represents a special analytical perspective. Along with this discussion,
different concepts of technoscience exist. In her paper, Weber (2010b) has
summarised the following different core elements which represent different
approaches or at least foci within the concept of technoscience:
• ‘‘…the amalgamation of technologies with everyday life…’’ (p. 22)
• ‘‘…the implosion of traditional dualisms such as nature/culture, human/
machine, subject/object and body/mind through the discourses and practices
of contemporary science and technology.’’ (p. 19)
• ‘‘…the molecularisation of life…’’ (p. 26)
• ‘‘…theintimatecouplingofhumanandmachine,withtheblurringoftheboundaries
between the human and the artiﬁcial and between body and mind.’’ (p. 26)
• ‘‘The emergence of a ‘new world order’ that comes not only with radical
epistemological, ontological and socio-material changes but also with enormous
socio-technical upheavals and restructuring of society and the symbolic order
and fundamental changes in the nature of class, race and gender.’’ (p. 19)
• ‘‘Technoscience marks ‘a historical break–not with regard to socio-technical
restructuring, but mainly with regard to the radical change of values of science
and technoscience, respectively. … Technoscience is seen primarily as an
entrepreneurial and pragmatic project in which technology assumes the leading
role in developing innovative solutions for speciﬁc societal problems, as well as
new markets.’’ (p. 21)
Technoscience asan historicalbreak hasbeen discussedindetail byForman: ‘‘The
abruptreversalofculturallyascribedprimacyinthescience–technologyrelationship–
namely, from the primacy of science relative to technology prior to circa 1980, to the
primacy of technology relative to science since about that date–is proposed as a
demarcator of postmodernity from modernity’’ (Forman 2007), abstract).
In general, two main perspectives that are combined in the discussion on
technoscience can be seen. One perspective emphasises social aspects within the
production of knowledge, such as power, domination, the role of speciﬁc actors, and
proﬁt; the other emphasises epistemic and more general aspects such as the
convergence of science and technology, of representing and intervening, of
understanding and performing, and of the natural and the artiﬁcial. I think that these
different perspectives are related to different analytical approaches: the philosophical
tradition of epistemology and the social perspective on technology (Weingart 2003,
p.41).Onecanarguethatthelatterisafurtherdevelopmentoftheformer,butitseems
to be that both approaches co-exist and have developed their own perspective (Greif
2002). ‘‘Philosophers care about justiﬁcation, logic, reason, soundness and method-
ology. The historical circumstances of discovery the psychological quirks, the social
interactions and the economic milieux are no professional concern of Popper or
Carnap.’’ (Hacking 2008 [1983], p. 6). On the other hand, as Weingart (2003, p. 82)
pointed out, some social scientists reduce the production of knowledge merely to a
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discussion on technoscience of nanotechnology (e.g. Nordmann 2005; Fogelberg and
Glimell 2003; Bensaude-Vincent 2004; Weber 2010b; Kastenhofer 2009), I had the
impression that the blending of these different approaches leads to confusion within
the argumentations. Notions such as pure science, disinterestedness and intervention
have different meanings regarding the different analytical frames (philosophy vs.
sociology),seesubsectionon‘‘Puriﬁcation’’.Apartfromthesedifferentapproaches,I
observeafurtherreasonforconfusion.Resultsthathavebeengainedfromtheanalysis
ofcertain‘‘technosciences’’(e.g.lifescience,robotics)areoftendirectlytransferredto
other technologies or scientiﬁc ﬁelds, such as physics, chemistry, or nanotechnology.
But different ﬁelds have different ‘‘epistemic cultures’’ (Knorr-Cetina), especially
concerning aspects of technoscience such as the ‘‘molecularisation of life’’ and the
‘‘blurringoftheboundariesbetweenthehumanandtheartiﬁcialandbetweenbodyand
mind’’ (Weber 2010b, p. 26, 19); it is questionable whether these aspects could be
observed in physics in the same manner as they can in life sciences.
From my perspective, it seems to be helpful to tease apart the different aspects
which are discussed using the term technoscience in order to determine what exactly
the term can be used to distinguish. The aim of this paper is to sharpen the notion of
technoscience and to specify the different meanings of these aspects. In order to
contribute to this challenge, I will analyse the relations between science and
technology, intervention and representation, and the natural and the artiﬁcial. I will
approach these subjects from the epistemological perspective and will concentrate
on the role of technology in the knowledge production of modern science.
2 Role of technology in modern science
The starting point of my analysis is the question, what, if at all, does
nanotechnology characterise as technoscience and especially whether it marks a
new relation between representation and intervention. An important element of the
argumentation of Alfred Nordmann in his paper from 2005 is that the scanning
tunnelling microscope (STM), one of the most prominent icons of nanotechnology,
1
blurs the difference between observation and intervention.
2 ‘‘With this instrument,
1 See e.g. (Baird and Shew 2002) and the workshop Imaging NanoSpace in 2005, Bielefeld (http://
www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/ZIF/AG/2005/05-11-Nordmann.html).
2 While in the discussion on technoscience the term ‘‘representation’’ (Hacking 2008 [1983]) is more
commonthantheterm‘‘observation’’,thephilosophicaltraditionalbaseforthetermis‘‘observation’’Stache
(1958). In the philosophical tradition, the process of observation is not simply reduced to ‘‘seeing with the
naked eye’’ but includes the relation and interaction of subject and object and the fact that observation is
relatedtotheory,especiallyinmodernnaturalscience.Thetermrepresentationtriestobypasstheproblemof
realismbyleavingopenthequestionofwhethertheory(representation)ﬁtstoreality(seee.g.Hacking2008
[1983], p. 130ff). While Hacking is using the term representation in a very broad way (‘‘When I speak of
representations I ﬁrst of all mean physical objects: ﬁgurines, statues, pictures, engravings, objects that are
themselves to be examined, regarded.
… Representations are external and public, be they the simplest sketch on a wall, or, when I stretch the
word ‘representation’, the most sophisticated theory about electromagnetic, strong, weak, or gravitational
forces’’ (Hacking 2008 [1983], p. 133)) it seems to be that Nordmann (2005) refers to the term
‘‘observation’’ in the cited paper. For my analysis the differentiation between representation and
observation is not essential.
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of investigation with this instrument, we no longer passively observe it but actively
intervene.’’ (Nordmann 2005, p. 7, transl. UF)
Inordertounderstandthedifferentaspectsoftheroleoftechnologyinscienceandto
identify new aspects in today’s technoscience, I would like to look back into history.
First I would like to turn attention to the origin of the term technology. The term
originatesfromtheGreekwordtechne ´ whichmeansskilfulness,thepotentialtoproduce
something (Birnbacher 1998, p. 615). Techne ´ means also to have the ability to reach
intended aims. In other words, technique does not have a goal in itself but it serves an
external purpose. ‘‘Technology is essentially a means of achieving arbitrary goals’’
(Birnbacher1998,p.613,transl.UF).Aristotleemphasisedtheaspectofproductionand
creation in contrast to natural development and decay. Therefore, technique has its
origin not in nature but in human activity. Techne ´ describes the potential to produce
somethinginaplannedmanner.Itis‘‘acreativeactingwhichiscorrectlycombinedwith
rationality’’(Aristoteles1991,p.235/[1140a9/10],transl.UF)oraswewouldsaytoday
techniqueisthe‘‘knowhow’’toproducesomething(Krohn1989,p.21):theproduction
of an artefact which is not naturally grown or taken from nature (like copper).
Here, we ﬁnd the origin of the contradiction between nature and technology, the
naturalandtheartiﬁcial:natureisthesphereofthegivenandnaturalgrowntechniqueis
the sphere of human activity in order to reach an intended goal. In connection with this
pairofopposites,thereisafurtheroriginalconnotationoftechnique:applyingtechnique
means to outwit nature (Krohn 1989, p. 20). With technique, it is possible to mislead
natureinorderthatitbehavesdifferentlythanusualtoserveman’spurposes.Therefore,
Aristotle deﬁnes mechanics as outwitting nature or as acting against nature (Hermann
1991 [1980], p. 17), while the aim of philosophy is to understand nature (Krohn 1989,
p.20).Evenintheearlymiddleages,techniquessuchastheArchimedeanscrew,which
is used to lift water, were perceived as a trick to irritate nature and to bypass its usual
behaviour (water does not ﬂow upwards but downwards). This meaning could even be
found aliveinthe term artiﬁcial withits root: artiﬁce. Thisshows usthat,veryearlyon,
technique could be perceived as a hybrid of knowledge (know how) and intervention.
3 Birth of modern science
It is always a forced ﬁt if one tries to ﬁnd a certain historical data to mark a
development which takes place over several tens or hundreds of years. There are
some arguments to assign the birth of modern science to the work of Tycho Brahe,
Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei, Frances Bacon, Isaac Newton (among others)
(Scha ¨fer 1999, p. 99; Sto ¨rig 1992 [1950], p. 179). A number of societal, economic,
and political developments, aetiologically relevant to the formation of modern
science, happened in the sixteenth century in Europe (see Sto ¨rig, p. 279). In the
following, I will concentrate on developments which took place in the scientiﬁc
realm and I will try to sketch the most important developments leading to the
formation of modern science and their constituting elements.
During the sixteenth century, astronomy was the ﬁeld in science which could be
perceived as the pivotal ﬁeld where traditional forms of seeking for knowledge were
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was that observation (of the movement of the stars) and theory (world view) were no
longer reconcilable, which led to the well-known Copernican Revolution.
3
Building on the new paradigm set by Copernicus and on a huge set of data
collected by Tycho Brahe
4 during his life, Johannes Kepler has reformulated the
planetary movements.
5 Essentially, the principle he has derived from his work base
on mathematics. He criticised the approach from Greek philosophers who have tried
to explain nature by different qualitative forces. ‘‘Differently from them, he
perceived nature quintessentially uniformly and all differences as only quantitative.
But the reduction of qualitative differences to quantitative relations is the secret of
the amazing success of science ‘Urbi material ibi geometeria’—where there is
matter there is mathematics, Kepler was proclaiming and thus was formulating for
the ﬁrst time the ideal of cognition constitutive for all subsequent sciences.’’ (Sto ¨rig
1992 [1950], p. 282, transl. UF).
Even more radical, Galileo Galilei has claimed that science must be based on
quantitativemathematicaldescriptionsofnature.
6Thelawsofnaturewereformulated
by mathematics and did not aim to explain the essence of phenomena but aimed to
describe its progression exactly. In other words, he did not ask why bodies fall (a
questionAristotletriedtoanswer)buthowtheyfall(Sto ¨rig1992[1950],p.283).Even
though he came to his conclusions basically by thought experiment (Hermann 1991
[1980], p. 9), Galilei claims that objects never stop their movement unless a force is
acting on them, that which we call today the ‘‘principle of inertia’’. This is exactly
contrarytoAristotlewhoclaimsthatallobjectshaveaninherenttendencytostoptheir
movement. The essential difference is that it is no longer believed that it is in the
‘‘nature’’ofobjectstostoptheirmovement,butitisnowbelievedthattheyarepassive
entities which are moved and stopped by forces according to natural laws.
Even though Galilei’s work is still based on analytical conclusion, it seems to be
the essential step towards modern science. With this step, empirical science, with its
hypothetico-deductive method, starts its advance and displaces the former dominant
way of cognition by the metaphysical analysis of principles (Scha ¨fer 1999, p. 99).
Two important and constructive elements of modern science could even be observed
in the work of Galilei: (1) abstraction and (2) experimentation.
3.1 Abstraction
The ﬁrst element is the conceptualisation of complex phenomena as a superposition
of different effects. For example, in order to describe the movement of falling
objects, this movement is composed of two antagonistic elements: attraction by the
3 Nicolaus Copernicus’ De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres) was published in 1543.
4 Due to his precise measurements, he could show in De nova stella (1573) that the dominant concept
‘celestial spheres’ are not consistent with his observations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tycho_Brahe).
5 In Astronomia nova (1609), he published his theorem that planets are moving along ellipses with the
sun at the focal point, which is known as the ﬁrst Kepler law (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kepler#
Astronomia_nova).
6 This project was later called the mathematisation of nature see Scha ¨fer (1999, p. 100).
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artiﬁcial conceptualisation to separate the two effects and describe them separately.
Unrealistic and not observable concepts such as ‘‘ideal movement’’ (which is
uniform and with no friction at all) are introduced. This disaggregation of different
aspects from a complex phenomenon and the introduction of unrealistic, general and
not observable phenomena and concepts—for example, inertia, velocity, acceler-
ation, force, impact and so on—are the core elements of modern physics.
3.2 Experimentation
The second element is the use of techniques to perform experimental measurements
in order to test hypotheses and to describe natural processes with mathematical
formulas (Scha ¨fer 1999, p. 97). Technique is used to observe artiﬁcially separated
phenomena and measure their progression. Galilei retarded the natural process of
falling in order to be able to determine the mathematical relations between the
abstract concepts which have been introduced: The distance (x) an object falls is
proportional to the square of the time (t) taken for it to fall (x = gt
2, g = const.).
For that purpose, he used channelled ramps with different slopes. Galilei has
‘‘manipulated’’ falling in an artiﬁcial manner (Scha ¨fer 1999, p. 67; Hermann 1991
[1980], p. 17). Therefore, Bacon concluded that the process of measuring comprises
not just observation but an intervention in the natural process (Scha ¨fer 1999, p. 105;
Hermann 1991 [1980], p. 20). Experimentation means the creation of an artiﬁcial
environment in order to observe aspects of nature which are naturally not observable
(Scha ¨fer 1999, p. 69).
We can conclude that the idea of the laboratory is to separate the object of
investigation completely from its environment and to control every aspect of the
process which is intended to be observed. On the practical level, complexity is
reduced by adjusting and manipulating boundary conditions in order to observe
artiﬁcial concepts and artiﬁcially separated effects.
Here, we see a new relation between cognition and technique. The renunciation
of the traditional view of cognition, which was based on pure logical reasoning, has
entailed the need for a new way of testing hypotheses: empirical experimentation.
This conforms to the technical ‘‘manipulation’’ of nature in order to separate
different artiﬁcially constructed phenomena. Now, technique is used to gain
knowledge. This is related to a shift in the perception of the natural and the artiﬁcial.
Technique is no longer seen as being antagonist to nature, or at least something that
stands aside from nature, but is seen as a part of nature. Technique also obeys
natural laws as everything else does (Hermann 1991 [1980], p. 18). This conforms
to a shift in the conception of nature. While before nature was perceived as
something which grows, is self-acting, and has an inherent telos, now it is perceived
in an abstract manner, as complex machinery (Descartes, Laplace) organised by
laws.
For my investigation on the question of if and how technoscience conquers the
relation of science and technology, especially in epistemological respect, this is an
important result. Therefore, here I would like to draw a provisional appraisal:
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Within the heart of the notion, technique has a connotation as an opponent to nature:
Technology is artiﬁcial. Furthermore, this connotation has the meaning of
outwitting or misleading nature in order to accomplish human goals. The formation
of modern science marks a turning point in the production of knowledge. While
previously cognition was pursued by pure reasoning, in modern science the
application of technology is an essential part of the production of knowledge.
Modern science is characterised by:
• Disaggregation of different aspects (e.g. gravitation, drag) of a complex
phenomenon (the falling of an object through the air) and introduction of
unobservable concepts such as force, velocity, inertia and impact.
• The formulation of the laws of nature which are valid for every kind of matter.
This is achieved by abstraction from the concrete object as well as from the
concrete observer and related contingencies such as time and location.
• Not asking why things happened but how things happened and trying to describe
these processes quantitatively by mathematics.
• Gaining knowledge not by intuition or pure logical conclusions but by observing
nature in artiﬁcial circumstances: the experimental set up is characterised by the
use of technology for manipulating natural processes in order to observe and
determine the progression of processes or speciﬁc aspects.
3.3 Modern science as applied science
I would like to cite a further aspect of technoscience which could be traced back to
the foundation of modern science: the change in direction from the ideal of research
for its own sake (to gain knowledge) to the idea of understanding nature to be able
to manipulate nature in order to serve human purposes. Francis Bacon is perhaps the
most prominent person who has proclaimed that the purpose of science is to raise
the living conditions of humans
7 (Scha ¨fer 1999, p. 95–96, 100, 102, 105f). The
change to empiric knowledge production is the precondition of a purpose-driven
science. Scha ¨fer emphasises that, due to Bacon (and other protagonists of that time,
for example Descartes, Hobbes), modern science is rooted in a structural bracing of
natural science, technological development, and the industrial exploitation of nature
(Scha ¨fer 1999, p. 97). Today, we would call this kind of purpose-driven cognition
applied science, which found its aim outside of the process of the knowledge
production, while pure science only seeks to increase knowledge.
8 Here, we have a
7 ‘‘Ad meritum et usus vitae’’ cited in (Scha ¨fer 1999, p. 102), footnote 5.
8 Stokes differentiates science by the relation of understanding and use (Stokes 1997). From his
perspective, both categories are goal oriented. But what is the goal of understanding if not the hope that
one can use this understanding once for a mundane purpose? I am not fully convinced of his quadruple
differentiation because between pure applied research (which is an idealisation and does not exist) and
use inspired fundamental research (e.g. cancer research), there is no third thing. There is only a
continuous shift in priorities of goals (understanding vs. use), or in other words a continuous transgression
between science and technology.
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relation of science, technology and the increase of economic wealth and progress.
9
3.4 Semiconductors
In the following, I would like to discuss two more ﬁelds of physics in order to
analyse the relation of intervention and representation. The ﬁrst ﬁeld is semicon-
ductor physics which is a part of solid-state physics. The interesting point with
respect to our analysis is that fundamental new insights in semiconductor physics
have been gained since the development of the knowledge for growing pure crystals
(Wagemann 1992, p. 473f). Similar to the problem discussed above, the separation
of the antagonistic forces—acceleration by gravitation and drag by air—in
semiconductor physics, it is necessary to investigate an idealised system, for
example a perfect crystal, in order to be able to test theoretical models empirically.
Thus, at the beginning, the driving force was not only the application of
semiconductor physics but also the development and proof of the theoretical models
and their mathematical descriptions.
10 In order to do this, it was necessary to build
extraordinary pure crystals—something which does not exist in nature and requires
tremendous effort. Crystals which show semiconductor behaviour are extremely
artiﬁcial. In semiconductor physics, we can perceive several aspects which are
characteristic of technoscience:
• It is based on the production of extraordinary artiﬁcial objects which are the
subject of investigation.
• Technique is essential to produce semiconductors with sufﬁcient purity.
• Purity is an important precondition for cognition.
• Semiconductor physics is strongly application oriented.
3.5 Elementary particles
The second example is particle physics. This ﬁeld is characterised by the production
of entities which are as artiﬁcial as semiconductors. In addition, they cannot be
observed directly because they decay immediately after they have been produced.
11
Incredible, highly sophisticated machines with ultra high vacuums are necessary to
produce them, and similar complex machines are necessary to observe them.
9 The idea of progress related to cognition was not conceived by the ancient Greek philosophers. It is also
a product of the age of modern science (Krohn 1989, p. 19).
10 Similar to material science, semiconductor physics was, from its beginning, closely intertwined with
technological interventions and practical applications. Practical problems have initiated and inspired
research questions—how to transform a MASER (Microwave Ampliﬁcation by Stimulated Emission of
Radiation) into a LASER—and effects observed in the laboratory (photoconductivity in 1873 by W.
Smith) have been transferred to practical application (light meter 1875 by W. v. Siemens) (Wagemann
1992, p. 473).
11 There are similarities to the investigation of ‘‘new’’ elements of the periodic table in atomic physics.
Similar to elemental particles, the objects of investigation (new elements) do not exist in nature but are
produced before their characteristics are measured. Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent calls such entities
‘‘technoscientiﬁc objects’’ (2010).
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all. It is obvious that these particles and the characteristics that are attributed to them
like ‘‘spin’’, ‘‘parity’’, ‘‘ﬂavour’’ and ‘‘colour’’ are constructions which may
correspond to aspects of nature but which are entirely dependent on theory and
could not be observed or denoted if the theory were different. But these
characteristics are helpful in order to setup hypotheses which could be experimen-
tally veriﬁed or falsiﬁed. However, very differently to semiconductor physics, no
serious idea exists as to how this kind of technology could be applied in order to
solve ‘‘real-world’’ problems or to increase welfare and raise general wealth.
Regarding technoscience, we can conclude that as with semiconductor physics,
particle physics:
• Is based on the production of extraordinary artiﬁcial objects which are the
subject of investigation.
• Technique is more than essential for the production of these particles.
• In a certain sense, purity (an ultra high vacuum) is also essential to observe these
objects.
But in contrasts to semiconductor physics, this research is not application
oriented.
4 Discussion
If we compare these ﬁndings with the subjects that are discussed in relation to
technoscience, we can conclude that, in the foundation of modern science, we ﬁnd
essential elements of these subjects. These elements are discussed in the following
sections.
4.1 Nature, technology and the artiﬁcial
The term technosciences is used to analyse the relationship between the artiﬁcial
and the natural which have been changed due to the new organisation and
orientation of modern-day science. Here, technology is the essential factor that
determines and permanently shifts the relation between the artiﬁcial and the natural.
While this seems to be obvious, if we are considering how strongly our every day
life is inﬂuenced by technology, the role of technology and thus the shift of the
boundary between the natural and the artiﬁcial in modern science is also obvious but
less clear. The ﬁrst part of this paper has shown that the use of technique in science,
especially in order to manipulate nature, has been characteristic since its beginning
in the sixteenth century. By introducing the experiment as the main principle for
cognition in natural science, nature is no more observed as one ﬁnds it but it is
manipulated in order to show speciﬁc aspects which are only observable in an
artiﬁcial environment.
12 This creation of artiﬁcial objects might have come to its
temporary peak with the creation of elementary particles in high-energy physics.
12 In the discussion of technoscience this is also called ‘‘co-production of things and facts’’.
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current, microwaves, laser beams, elements of the periodic table and chemical
compounds.
Along with the development of modern science, we can observe a change in
the perception of the relation of nature and technique. Technique is no more seen
as contradictory to nature. Technique has to follow the same laws as do processes
in nature and vice versa. But while the interconnectedness of science and
technology has changed continuously up to now, with the foundation of modern
science during the sixteenth century, an epochal break could be observed
regarding the perception of the relation of nature and technology. While
previously nature was perceived as something which grows, which is self-acting,
and has an inherent telos, now nature is perceived in an abstract manner and as
complex machinery which is organised by laws. This concept was even extended
to living beings and the human body (Descartes 1986 [1641], p. 201[83/84). It has
led to enormous progress in cognition; thus, one can even explain how speciﬁc
chemical agents inﬂuence mental states. It has contributed to the mechanisation of
daily life (up to the most intimate personal relations). One might assign the climax
of this concept to the 1960s when man was exhilarated by space ﬂight and the
landing of the ﬁrst man on the moon. This cognition-guiding concept has
experienced its biggest crises due to ecological and technical catastrophes which
have resulted in insights into the complexity of ecological systems (Carson 1962)
and the uncontrollability of big technologies (Luhmann 1991; Douglas and
Wildavsky 1993; Jonas 1987; Scha ¨fer 1999). But, in the framework of
nanotechnology, this concept seems to have experienced a renaissance. In 1986,
Drexler conceptually designated nanotechnology as molecular engineering (Drex-
ler 1986). Biotechnological objects, including genetic engineering, are perceived
as ‘‘soft machines’’ (Jones 2004) and are paradigmatic for synthetic biology
(Deplazes and Huppenbauer 2009).
4.2 Intervention and representation
In the previous section, it was made clear that technology is the pivotal point with
respect to the relation of the natural and the artiﬁcial and it is, at the same time, the
core element of modern science. It is often stated that nanotechnology will
revolutionise the potential of technology. It will enable man to ‘‘shape the world
atom by atom’’. If one is examining the technical world
13 which is assigned to
nanotechnology, its revolutionary potential is hard to comprehend (see Schummer
2009a, b). Nanotechnology offers no new tools and techniques which are essentially
different to techniques used to generate artiﬁcial objects like semiconductors,
chemical compounds and elementary particles. Here, I would like to return to the
initial question: Does the STM mark a speciﬁc relation between intervention and
representation? Compared with the abovementioned examples relating to the STM,
we cannot determine new fundamental aspects, such as the inability to abstract
13 Jutta Weber calls this the ‘‘ontological properties of objects of investigation’’ (Weber 2003, p. 231,
transl. UF).
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experimental praxis.
14 The fact that information about a surface is generated by
scratching the surface with a needle is not an expression of a new kind of mix of
manipulation and representation. It is one step in the continuous reﬁnement of the
use of technology within experimentation. The use of technology within experi-
mentation is one of the constituencies of modern science but not new or speciﬁc to
nanotechnology.
15 Continuous development would become more clear if one
compares this experimental praxis with other measurement tools, such as, among
others, the scanning electron microscope (SEM), which was invented in the early
1930s or with X-ray diffraction (XRD) which was used for the ﬁrst time in 1912
(Luger 1992, p. 110).
What I would like to emphasise here is that in physics, the fundamental concepts
regarding the relation between the natural and the artiﬁcial were set up during the
development of modern science in the sixteenth century. Since then, techniques
have become more and more sophisticated and more and more important for natural
science. But this is a continuous process which is not ﬁnished nor has it, at least in
physics, entered a new qualitative level.
16 This might be different in life science.
Techniques, such as genetic engineering, in vitro fertilisation and cloning, might
introduce new qualities into the relationship between the natural and the artiﬁcial.
For me, it seems to be plausible that hybrids such as the onco-mouse are
extraordinary examples of how technical intervention is extended into living beings.
Here, we ﬁnd a mixture of the naturally grown and the artiﬁcially produced which
might be signiﬁcantly different from previous manipulations produced by breeding
which leads to high-output cows or pigs with extra vertebra. Another ﬁeld where the
traditional concepts of the natural and the artiﬁcial are contested could be found
when it comes to human nature and the technical interventions into the human body
14 Nordmann argues: ‘‘The STM has become the symbol for nanoscience not because with its help we
can see atoms, but we can move them intentionally’’ (Nordmann 2005, p. 7, transl. UF). I agree with this
statement. But I think the reason for this is not the how technology is used within science. It might be only
a slight difference when I argue that the reason is that this instrument could be used to tell a story. It offers
a link to the narrative ‘‘moving the very atom intentionally’’. The STM plays an important role in
constructing the nanotechnological myth that mankind (for the ﬁrst time) is ‘‘shaping the world atom by
atom’’—Alfred Nordmann has contributed a lot to this perception of the role of these narratives. I think
that there are additional aspects which gave the STM such a role. One is the fact that it produces pictures
of surfaces which could be in colour and which are in a way familiar to us because they resemble pictures
of landscapes (see e.g. Nordmann 2003;L o ¨sch 2004). The other is related to the successful ‘‘proof of
principle’’ by moving atoms by Don Eigler’s IBM-Picture.
15 The question whether nanotechnology is technoscience or marks a new relation between science and
technology is a somewhat misleading question. The reason is that there are too many too different
methods, research activities, technical applications and processes which are attributed to nanotechnology
as if this were a meaningful assignment. It is an inadequate generalisation. It could be compared with the
experiments to characterise a whole ﬁeld of science (e.g. biology, chemistry, material research etc.) as
being dangerous or harmless or helpful or what ever.
16 One can argue that the development of the atomic bomb and the ability to destroy all higher life on
earth marks a new level of domination of man over nature. Usually this overstepping of limits is not used
to characterise the age of technoscience and I do not see what one could gain analytically if one did.
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human enhancement
17 (Barkhaus and Fleig 2002a; Habermas 2001).
4.3 Puriﬁcation: pure science, applied science and disinterestedness
Another essential complex that is discussed with the help of the term technoscience
is the role of interests within the production of knowledge. Some colleagues see the
differenzia speciﬁca of technoscience in the orientation under which it is performed:
technoscience is purpose driven, in contrast to science which is curiosity
driven;‘‘Basic technoscience research is dedicated to the acquisition of basic
capabilities of visualisation, manipulation, modelling and control and is not
dedicated to the advance of the Enlightenment by way of truth seeking or the
criticism of prejudice and superstition’’ (Nordmann 2010, p. 7/8; see also Nordmann
2004, p. 59/60; Weber 2010a, p. 12/13); or in the words of Forman ‘‘the primacy of
technology relative to science instead of the primacy of science relative to
technology’’ (Forman 2007, p. 9) which mark a change in valuation. (But then we
have to acknowledge that, e.g. elementary particles are no technoscientiﬁc objects).
In the introduction, I wrote that the different perspectives on cognition—
philosophical and sociological—are related with different connotations of terms like
pure science, disinterestedness, and intervention. Therefore, I would like to shed
light on the different meanings of the terms ‘‘pure’’ and the ‘‘work of puriﬁcation’’
(Nordmann 2010, p. 7 footnote 2). The following meanings can be distinguished:
1. Free of experience Science could be pure because it is not based on empiricism.
Pure science seeks idealised fundamental principles. This is related to the
original concept of Greek philosophy and has been re-evaluated by Kant when
he tried to investigate how synthetic conclusions a priori would be possible.
18
The superiority of theory
19 over praxis has its roots in Greek philosophy
(Schna ¨delbach 1998, p. 40). Cognition has been considered to be of value in
itself (Scha ¨fer 1999, p. 102) and has been evaluated more highly as craft. These
moral concepts were present until the last century and can be observed even
today when humanities are perceived as sublime and engineering as ordinary
craft (Birnbacher 1998, p. 606; Weingart 2001, p. 60). Exactly the re-evaluation
of the relation of theory and praxis in science, which Forman dates to the 1980s,
is that which he identiﬁes as the turn of science into technoscience. In a similar
vein is the idea that pure science (theory) is not made impure by practical
17 The whole debate on human enhancement and transhumanity is an interesting phenomenon, which was
related to robotics and artiﬁcial intelligence and has now found a new place in the ﬁeld of
nanotechnology. In this context I would like to emphasise that despite the fact that such discussions take
place under the label of a certain technology, such as AI or nanotechnology, one cannot conclude that the
aspects which are discussed are characteristics of this technology. Instead, the correlation between these
issues and the technology has to be investigated and worked out.
18 The background to Kant’s project is the crisis of inductive cognition (Kant 1989 [1783]). Hume has
shown that there is no logical bridge which leads from the singular result of an experiment to a general
principle (Hume 1982 [1748]). Finally, this crisis led Popper to the conclusion that scientiﬁc principles
can only be falsiﬁed but never veriﬁed (Popper 1963).
19 Theory as the recognition of essential phenomena (Scha ¨fer 1998, p. 470; Schna ¨delbach 1998, p. 41).
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complex theoretical systems.
2. In a slightly different vein is the work of abstraction and idealisation as one
essential element of modern science (see p. 5). Here, pure is understood in the
sense of ideal but not observable in the real world. The process of falling is
separated from the dragging force produced by air. Hence, in a perfect vacuum,
all objects (be it a feather or a ball of lead) fall in the same way, e.g. with the
same acceleration. This meaning of puriﬁcation is related to the ﬁrst in so far as
practical problems are disregarded.
3. Free of personal interests The main constituent of the ethos of a researcher is
that he or she should stand back form his or her personal beliefs, preferences
and emotions. Seeking knowledge has to be performed by unbiased observation
and disinterested logical reasoning. They will lose their connection to reality if
observation and modelling are driven by beliefs and preferences (Weingart
2001, p. 51, 57, 59, 69).
These three aspects are more related to philosophical argumentations on
epistemology while both following aspects focus more on the social aspects of
the organisation of research.
4. Free of practical purpose In this sense, science is pure if it is not driven by
purpose but has to be performed for its own sake, to gain knowledge, driven by
curiosity. Pure science is not performed in order to be applied and to solve a
practical problem. It does not have to be legitimised by its social relevance.
This kind of orientation of science could be identiﬁed with basic science.
5. Freeofpoliticalexertionofinﬂuence In history, there are many examples where
science has been misused for the justiﬁcation of power. Especially, the dispute
between science and religion to gain power during the Middle Ages has raised
the awareness that freedom in research is a prerequisite for cognition (Weingart
2001, p. 76). Therefore, within the relation of science and society, there is a
tricky balance between societal interests and funding (Weingart 2001, p. 78).
Within the discussion on technoscience, the different meanings are often
combined or even mixed up. In some publications, the orientation of science
towards application and social purpose alone qualiﬁes science as technoscience:
‘‘Instead of seeking to humbly understand and explain a given nature, they now
openly embrace the project of overhauling or transforming nature, of ‘Shaping the
World Atom by Atom’’’ (Nordmann 2004, p. 59/60).
Firstly, I would like to point out that the idea that science is not only performed
for its own sake or to gain knowledge but has to serve social purposes is closely
related to the formation of modern science and was strongly claimed by Francis
Bacon. Therefore, in order to discuss new developments within today’s scientiﬁc
organisation, it seems to be useful not to restrict the meaning of technoscience to the
fourth interpretation regarding the purity of science.
Secondly, a point I would like to raise in this context, is that the focus on
practical purpose reduces the term technoscience to just another term for
engineering and shifts the discussion towards the nexus of science, theory and
engineering.
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to be pragmatism: while science is only interested in techniques in order to reveal
theoretical hypotheses, engineering does not care for theory.
20 From the engineering
perspective, the job is done if it works, no matter how or why. This is exactly what
Nordmann means, when he concludes that ‘‘…‘pure’ science is pure precisely
because they invest a lot of analytical effort into the conceptual and technical
separation of these two [representing and intervening] activities’’ but ‘‘[it] would be
a moot exercise to take this pharmacological agent or to take the effected dilatation
of the arteries and carefully tease apart what is due to human intervention and what
to features of nature’’
21 (Nordmann 2010, p. 7). To sell a pharmaceutical, it is not
necessary to explain how it works, it is important that it works and that it does not
produce intolerable side effects. But if one would have progression in cognition,
theory is necessary. And then it would be very helpful to know how the agent leads
to the dilatation of the arteries. According to the hypothetico-deductive method,
reliable hypotheses which can be tested can only be produced if there is a theoretical
understanding. Otherwise trial and error, ‘‘tinkering’’, or ‘‘bricolage’’ will tap into
the dark and the next successful trial will be found just by chance.
4.4 Control and domination
A further complex that is related to the term technoscience is domination and power.
It is stated that, within technoscience, the subjection of nature has become a new
quality (Stoff 2010, p. 119). Its inherent tendency to control is pervasively
embracing society, personal relations, even the human body and might even alter
the nature of human. This seems to be reached with genetic engineering and the
cloning of mammals. The critique of this ‘‘scientiﬁcation’’ and mechanisation of all
aspects of daily life is a core subject in the discussion of technoscience (e.g. Weber
2003, p. 223). But this topic has a long tradition starting with Max Weber (Weingart
2003, p. 9), could be found in Jaspers (1949, p.127), might have had its peak in the
1960s (according to Degele 2002, p. 28), and has been discussed more recently by
Jonas (1987), Habermas (2001), and Bo ¨hme (2002). The idea that science is
performed to subdue nature was previously proclaimed by Bacon (Scha ¨fer 1999)
and is a core element of modern science. It has its origin in the ancient connotation
20 As already mentioned in fn. 8, Stokes differentiates science by the relation of understanding and use.
Both categories are—according to Stokes—goal oriented. If understanding is only performed for the sake
of understanding, I think that ‘‘goal orientation’’ is a misleading category. If knowledge is to be striven for
in order to be able to solve problems, understanding is only the indirect goal and problem solving the
direct one. Further, this differentiation is misleading because between pure applied research (which does
not exist) and use inspired fundamental research (e.g. cancer research), there is no third thing. There is
only a continuous shift in priorities of goals (understanding vs. use) and thus a continuous transgression
between science and technology.
21 Interestingly, the quote from Nordmann shows again the latent preoccupation with the question ‘‘what
is natural?’’ and ‘‘what is artiﬁcial?’’ But here it is mixed with the question ‘‘what can I know about a
subject?’’ The question ‘‘what belongs to nature?’’ or ‘‘what part of a process is natural and what is
artiﬁcial?’’ is and was completely irrelevant for natural science. In modern science, elementary particles
belong to nature together with the accelerator built to produce them. Whether something is produced by
man or by processes which are not initiated or inﬂuenced by man (i.e. nature) is irrelevant for my
understanding and thus is not a question of cognition.
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domination are inherent properties of reason and are related to the principle of
abstraction and de-contextualisation (Adorno and Horkheimer 1991 [1944];
Horkheimer 1985 [1947]) (Adorno 1988 [1966]). This critique also can be found
in the discourse on technoscience. There it is transformed into a question of
puriﬁcation of natural objects and the idea that the construction of purely epistemic
objects is merely a way of trimming nature until it ﬁts into the theory, leaving aside
the ontological properties of the objects of investigation (Weber 2003). With the
notion of the ‘‘molecularisation of life’’, a similar property of modern science is
critically denoted. This critic addresses the perception of nature as complex
machinery mentioned above.
5 Conclusion
If we look at the history of modern science, we could not ﬁnd a speciﬁc point at
which representation and intervention start to be indistinguishable. Instead, due to
the fact that technique has been essential for modern science from its early
beginning, modern science is characterised by a hybridisation of knowledge and
intervention and by the production of their artiﬁcial objects of investigation.
Moreover, the idea that knowledge is gained not for its own sake but to raise wealth
and living conditions has been related to modern science from its beginning. The
structural bracing of natural science, technological development and industrial
exploitation of nature go back to the foundation of modern science. The answer to
the question in the title of my paper—When does the co-evolution of technology
and science overturn into technoscience?—would be: ‘‘Never or for ever’’. Never,
because representation and intervention still can be and even has to be distinguished
in order to be able to perform cognition. For ever, which means here since the
foundation of modern science itself, because the amalgamation of intervention and
representation, of manipulation and observation of nature, of technology and
science, are essential elements of modern science.
Furthermore, during the period since the foundation of modern science, the
perception of the relation of nature and technology has changed radically. Since
then, nature has been perceived in an abstract manner and as complex machinery
which is organised by general laws. In contrast, the role of technology in science has
changed continuously. The manipulation of nature in order to measure its properties
has steadily increased until artiﬁcial things have been produced, such as laser
beams, chemical compounds, elementary particles and Bose–Einstein-condensates.
The STM and nanotechnology do not deserve a central position in this continuum of
reﬁnement of the use of technology within experimentation. If we perceive ‘‘the
primacy of technology relative to science’’ (Forman 2007, p. 9) as the differentia
speziﬁca between science and technoscience, it is questionable whether the term
technoscience can be useful to reveal new developments within the organisation of
science and the production of knowledge. Instead, the relation between observation
and intervention is reformulated into the question: how far can ‘‘tinkering’’,
‘‘bricolage’’ or engineering go, just by trial and error, without using theory?
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with the complex of control. This complex combines other aspects of technoscience.
For instance, several meanings of ‘‘pure’’ coming together: abstraction and
idealisation, practical purpose and political exertion. Therefore, I think that the
complex of control is the most fruitful element of the term technoscience. Here, I
see the innovative moment of the term. It allows the investigation of control and
domination as an inherent mechanism of research which takes place in the way in
which scientiﬁc objects are physically constructed. In addition, it reframes the
question of the natural and the artiﬁcial which might lead to the monitoring of the
shift of the unavailable (Barkhaus and Fleig 2002b).
Nevertheless, the use of techniques and the creation of artiﬁcial objects of
investigation are not new phenomena. If the discussion on technoscience leads to
new conclusions, the method of manipulating nature and the extent of that
manipulation have to be considered. The speciﬁc characteristics of technoscientiﬁc
objects have to be clariﬁed as have the speciﬁc characteristics of the social
organisation of technoscience and its performance. The precise role of technology in
technoscience needs to be determined together with the concepts of nature on which
technosciences rely. I think answers to these points could enhance the analytical
value of the notion of technoscience and could help in understanding the new
developments that science encounters.
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